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INTRODUCTION
The last time I spoke at Georgetown University Law Center was on the
occasion of the eightieth anniversary of the Legal Adviser's Office, known
* Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State; Martin R. Flug '55 Professor of International Law (on
leave), Yale Law School. @ 2013, Harold Hongju Koh. This is a lightly edited and footnoted version of
the 33rd Thomas F. Ryan Lecture, which was delivered at the Georgetown University Law Center,
Washington, D.C., on October 17, 2012. I am grateful to Deans Bill Treanor and Greg Klass and the
Ryan Lecture Committee for including me in Georgetown's great tradition in international law and
human rights, particularly the legacy of the late, great Father Bob Drinan, in whose honor I had the joy
of giving the inaugural lecture for the Drinan Chair in Human Rights just a few years ago. See Harold
Hongju Koh, Father Drinan's Revolution, 95 GEO. L.J. 1709 (2007). I was especially touched to meet
Christine Coffey Ryan, the wife of the late Thomas F. Ryan, and her daughter, White House Fellow
Missy Ryan, and to learn of the many illustrious lawyers who preceded me as Ryan Lecturer, especially
my late boss, Associate Justice Harry A. Blackmun. Finally, I am grateful to my many wonderful
colleagues at the Legal Adviser's Office who gave me ideas and support for this Lecture, including my
Deputy Sue Biniaz; my Counselors of International Law, Geoff Klineberg, Sarah Cleveland, and Bill
Dodge; Assistant Legal Advisers Evelyn Aswad, Paul Dean, and Alexandra Perina; and my friends and
colleagues Kevin Baumert, Gilda Brancato, Steve Fabry, Virginia Frasure, Julie Herr, Brian Israel, Ian
McKay, and Kathleen Milton. My greatest thanks go to my fabulous Special Assistants Kimberly
Gahan, Emily Kimball, and, for his particular contributions to this work, David Zionts, who has been a
particular joy to work with, during the early days of what will doubtless be a brilliant scholarly career
in international law.
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affectionately at the State Department as "L."' I have now been the Legal
Adviser at the State Department for more than three and a half years. During
that time, at nearly every public event I attend, I find myself being asked
questions about one issue: armed conflict. Nearly every question I am asked
involves Guantanamo, Afghanistan, cyber war, detention, and targeting prac-
tices. While these key areas raise tremendously important legal questions, in
fact, they do not occupy even half of my time. More than half of my time is
spent on a completely different set of issues, which I almost never get a chance
to talk about publicly.
So today, let me talk not about international conflict, but about the other side
of what I do: the legal aspects of international cooperation and engagement.
Specifically, let me address how we in the Obama Administration have handled
a broad set of activities that can be grouped loosely under the rubric of
"twenty-first-century international lawmaking."
Now I would expect that many, if not most, of you have already studied, or
even taught, this topic, whether in a constitutional law, international law,
national security law, or foreign relations law class. You all know the hornbook
law on this subject: the United States can make law through international
cooperation via one of three domestic law devices: (1) an Article II treaty,
advised and consented to by two-thirds of the Senate;2 (2) a congressional-
executive agreement, which involves passage of a statute by a majority of both
houses and signature by the President;3 and (3) under certain circumstances, by
sole executive agreement, concluded within the scope of the President's indepen-
dent constitutional authority.4 Indeed, sketching this tripartite framework of
Article II treaty, congressional-executive agreement, and sole executive agree-
ment is Lesson I of Foreign Relations Law 101. Over my academic career, those
core lessons constitute a law school course that I have often taught and law
review articles that I have published.
But it turns out that in the real world-I have found during my time at L-it
is just not that simple. In this Lecture, I hope to challenge your preconceived
notions of how today's practice of international legal engagement really works.
In the twenty-first century, I would argue, we are now moving to a whole host
of less crystalline, more nuanced forms of international legal engagement and
cooperation that do not fall neatly within any of these three pigeonholes. My
message is that in the twenty-first century, our international legal engagement
has become about far more than just treaties and executive agreements. We need
1. Harold Hongju Koh, Remarks, The State Department's Legal Adviser's Office: Eight Decades in
Peace and War, 100 GEO. L.J. 1747 (2012).
2. See Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTRTION 176 (2d ed. 1996)
(quoting U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2).
3. See id. at 215-18.
4. See id. at 219-24.
5. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, The Fast Track and United States Trade Policy, 18 BROOK. J. INT'L
L. 143, 145-47 (1992) (summarizing these options in the trade-agreement context).
726 [Vol. 101:725
TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY INTERNATIONAL LAWMAKING
a better way to describe the texture of the tapestry of modem international
lawmaking and related activities that stays truer to reality than this procrustean
construct that academics try to impose on a messy reality. To give you a fuller
sense of that texture, let me describe our current international lawmaking
practice with regard to entering and complying with treaties; executive agree-
ments and customary international law; and emerging modes of international
legal engagement, such as what I will call "diplomatic law-talk," layered
cooperation, and hybrid public-private arrangements.
I. OUR VARIED INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ENGAGEMENT PRACTICES
A. TREATIES AND INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
Let me start with treaties. Even in this age of legislative near-deadlock,6
treaties-in the constitutional, Senate "advice and consent" sense-remain an
integral part of our international lawmaking practice. Article II of the Constitu-
tion gives the President the power to "make treaties," subject to the advice and
consent of two-thirds of the Senate,' and the Supremacy Clause-Article
VI-makes those treaties "the supreme law of the land." 8
But in modem times, Article II treaties have never been the only option. The
long-dominant view in the academy 9-articulated by my late Yale colleague
Myres McDougal and Asher Lans in The Yale Law Journal as far back as
1945-has been that treaties and congressional-executive agreements are in fact
interchangeable, legally available options for binding the United States in its
international relations.'o At the same time, a governmental practice has arisen
of doing certain types of agreements by treaty: for example, extradition,"
human rights,12 membership in international organizations,13 and arms control
6. See, e.g., Jonathan Weisman, Congress Heads for Home with Rancor Still Evident, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 21, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/22/us/politics/lawmakers-going-home-with-rancor-still-
evident.html.
7. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
8. Id. art. VI ("[A]ll Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States,
shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing
in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.").
9. See HENKIN, supra note 2, at 217 ("[I]t is now widely accepted that the Congressional-Executive
agreement is available for wide use, even general use, and is a complete alternative to a treaty."
(footnote omitted)).
10. Myres S. McDougal & Asher Lans, Treaties and Congressional-Executive or Presidential
Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments of National Policy: I, 54 YALE L.J. 181 (1945).
11. See 18 U.S.C. § 3181 note (2006) (listing U.S. extradition treaties).
12. See GLEN S. KRuTZ & JEFFREY S. PEAKE, TREATY POLITICS AND THE RISE OF EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS:
INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS IN A SYSTEM OF SHARED POWERS 48 (2009) (noting that "human rights
agreements have always been submitted to the Senate as treaties").
13. See, e.g., U.N. Charter, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, 1 U.N.T.S. XVI (consented to by the
Senate on July 28, 1945); North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243 (creating
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and consented to by the Senate on July 21, 1949).
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matters.14 Other forms of international lawmaking have traditionally been done
by congressional-executive agreement. For example, free-trade agreements
have traditionally been entered into with the ex post approval of Congress
expressed through subsequent legislation.' 5
I am sometimes asked, why don't we just ratify a particular convention by
congressional-executive agreement, rather than Article II treaty? If it is so hard
to get sixty-seven votes for a treaty, why don't we just accede to it by statute?
The short answer, which you will understand sitting here less than a mile from
the Capitol, is that a particular nontreaty route might be legally available to the
Executive for entering into certain kinds of international agreements but may
not be politically advisable as a matter of comity to Congress. Congress has its
own strong views on how certain types of agreements should be entered into
and will fight for those outcomes as a matter of institutional and political
prerogative. That does not mean that the Executive's hands are tied in any given
case. But what it does mean is that a key part of being an Executive Branch
lawyer is accurately forecasting to your clients when choosing a particular legal
route-even if lawful-may foster bitter political conflict and invite unneces-
sary trouble.
Every time we enter into an Article II treaty, we also send the world a
message. Securing a sixty-seven-vote Senate supermajority for a treaty is
particularly hard work and requires a very high degree of bipartisanship. In any
given case, concluding a treaty with the requisite two-thirds support sends a
powerful political message about how united our nation is behind a particular
international obligation. And so, for all their difficulties, Article II treaties
remain a critically important focus of our international lawmaking practice.
Take the New START treaty, which passed the Senate in 2010 by a hard-won
vote of 71-26.16 Under New START, the United States and Russia agreed to
limits on the number of deployed warheads and nuclear-weapon-delivery ve-
hicles, as well as complicated verification procedures." Lawyers in my office
played a key role in this massive effort-advising policymakers, working on
language at the negotiating table, and working with the Senate every step of the
way to ensure ratification. Why was New START so important? Because that
treaty allowed us to resume on-site inspections of Russian facilities, a right that
14. See, e.g., Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729
U.N.T.S. 161 (consented to by the Senate on March 13, 1969).
15. See JEANNE J. GRIMMETr, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 97-896, WHY CERTAIN TRADE AGREEMENTS ARE
APPROVED AS CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTs RATHER THAN As TREADEs (2012) (surveying
free-trade agreements approved by Congress).
16. See Peter Baker, Senate Passes Arms Control Treaty with Russia, 71-26, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 22,
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/23/world/europe/23treaty.html.
17. See Remarks on Signing the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty with President Dmitry A.
Medvedev of Russia and an Exchange with Reporters in Prague, Czech Republic, 2010 DAILY COMR
PREs. Doc. 241 (Apr. 8, 2010).
728 [Vol. 101:725
TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY INTERNATIONAL LAWMAKING
had expired along with the previous START treaty.18 Restoring this "trust but
verify" regime was critical to a genuine system of arms control, which is why
President Obama called ratifying the New START treaty a "national security
imperative." 9
Currently before the Senate, as you probably know, are two more treaties that
the Obama Administration is strongly supporting. The first is the 1982 Law of
the Sea Convention,2 0 which Secretary Clinton testified in support of in May
2012.21 Although that treaty has long enjoyed substantial bipartisan support and
was also pushed by our predecessors in the Bush Administration,2 2 some critics
have alleged that joining it would sacrifice our national sovereignty.2 3 But
nothing could be further from the truth. In fact, the opposite is true: joining the
Convention would enhance our sovereignty. It would secure for the United
States sovereign rights over vast new areas and resources, including continental-
shelf areas extending off our coasts and into the Arctic, at least six hundred
miles off Alaska. It would give U.S. companies the legal certainty they need to
make expensive investments and create American jobs.2 4 It would enhance our
national security by guaranteeing our military the freedom-of-navigation prin-
18. See Baker, supra note 16 (explaining that the treaty "provides for a resumption of on-site
inspections, which halted when the original Start treaty expired last year").
19. See Remarks Prior to a Meeting on the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty and an Exchange with
Reporters, 2010 DAILY COMP. PRES. Doc. 995 (Nov. 18, 2010). Despite the Senate having completed the
advice-and-consent phase of treaty accession in 2008, this Administration is still seeking congressional
action to allow our ratification of two other treaties designed to strengthen our legal basis for securing
nuclear materials and preventing nuclear terrorism: the 2005 amendment to the Convention on the
Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of
Nuclear Terrorism. These treaties require updates to the United States criminal code, for which the
Administration presented draft legislation in 2010 and again last year. The House passed a version of
this bill last summer, and we await Senate action that would permit us finally to deposit our instruments
of ratification. See Nuclear Terrorism Conventions Implementation and Safety of Maritime Navigation
Act of 2012, H.R. 5889, 112th Cong. (as passed by House, June 28, 2012); Implementation of Certain
International Nuclear and Maritime Terrorism Agreements: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime,
Terwrism, & Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 24-27 (2011)
(testimony of Thomas M. Countryman, Assistant Secretary of State for International Security &
Nonproliferation).
20. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397
(entered into force Nov. 16, 1994).
21. See Accession to the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention and Ratification of the 1994 Agreement
Amending Part XI of the Law of the Sea Convention: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign
Relations, 112th Cong. (2012) (written testimony of Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State)
[hereinafter Law of Sea Testimony], available at http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/
REVISEDSecretary-Clinton Testimony.pdf.
22. See, e.g., Henry Kissinger, George Shultz, James Baker III, Colin Powell & Condoleezza Rice,
Op-Ed, Time To Join the Law of the Sea Treaty, WALL ST. J., May 30, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/articlel
SB10001424052702303674004577434770851478912.html.
23. See Donna Cassata, Sea Treaty All but Dead, 34 GOP Senators Oppose, AssocArED PRESS, July
16, 2012, http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2012/07/16/sea-treaty-allbutdead-
34_gop-senators-oppose/.
24. See Kissinger et al., supra note 22.
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ciples enshrined in the Convention.2 5 And it would amplify our voice when we
use the Law of the Sea platform to speak about the numerous maritime issues
that implicate our national interests, such as the ongoing tensions in the South
China Sea.26 For these reasons, we continue to be hopeful that the Senate will
act on these interests and soon give advice and consent to the Law of the Sea
Convention.
Second, we also are urging the Senate to give its advice and consent to the
Disabilities Convention-the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabili-
ties.2 7 Here in the United States, we have a long history of bipartisan leadership
on domestic disability legislation, including the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA)28-legislation that is not only the gold standard worldwide but served as
the model for this very Convention.29 At its heart, the Convention promotes a
core principle of our Constitution: nondiscrimination. It seeks to ensure that all
persons with disabilities would be able to enjoy the same rights as nondisabled
persons, on an equal basis with them. My office, with substantial input from the
Department of Justice and other key agencies, prepared the article-by-article
analysis and proposed reservations, understandings, and declarations in the
transmittal package for this treaty,30 and it has actively assisted the ratification
efforts. 3 ' This past July 26, the twenty-second anniversary of the Americans
with Disabilities Act, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee sent the treaty to
the Senate floor with bipartisan support.32 Again, we hope to see the full Senate
give its advice and consent to this and other human rights treaties soon.
25. See The Law of the Sea Convention (Treaty Doc. 103-39): The U.S. National Security and
Strategic Imperatives for Ratification: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 112th
Cong. (2012) (testimony of Gen. Martin E. Dempsey, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff), available at
http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/General Dempsey-Testimony%20(2012-05-23)%20
(Final).pdf.
26. See, e.g., Law of Sea Testimony, supra note 21, at 8.
27. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for signature Dec. 13, 2006, 2515
U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force May 3, 2008).
28. 42 U.S.C §§ 12101-12213 (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
29. Press Statement, Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State, Celebrating 20 Years of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (July 26, 2010), available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/07/
145144.htm.
30. See S. TREATY Doc. No. 112-7 (2012).
31. See, e.g., S. EXEC. REP. No. 112-6, at 7 (2012) (describing Senate committee hearings).
32. See id. (recommending Senate approval by a 13-6 vote).
33. Also before the Senate is the long-delayed advice and consent to the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), or the Women's Treaty,
adopted Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13. See Office of the Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State, Treaties
Pending in the Senate, http://www.state.gov/s/1/treaty/pendinglindex.htm (last updated May 18, 2012).
The Administration strongly supports U.S. ratification of the CEDAW, a landmark convention that
seeks to eradicate discrimination against women in a wide variety of settings, including in the
workplace, education, and the provision of health care. U.S. ratification of CEDAW is long overdue,
because it would give the United States a powerful tool to combat discrimination against women
around the world. Press Statement, U.S. Dep't of State, Thirtieth Anniversary of the United Nations'




Now just a few generations ago, what you just heard me say would have been
both the beginning and the end of a speech on international lawmaking: the
Constitution specifies treaties as the constitutionally enumerated mechanism for
entering international agreements, and that's that. Indeed, scholars such as my
friend and former Obama Administration colleague Larry Tribe made such an
argument in the 1990s, when he called unconstitutional the mechanism by
which the Clinton Administration joined NAFTA-by an Act of Congress, or as
a congressional-executive agreement.3 4 But the overwhelming consensus in the
legal academy rejected that view and approved of the way our constitutional
practice has developed to permit binding agreements entered into by the Execu-
tive and approved by majorities of both houses of Congress.
The constitutionality of these congressional-executive agreements is now
well settled, particularly where Congress is exercising its foreign commerce
power.36 Indeed, the United States used a congressional-executive agreement as
the procedure to conclude the 1945 Bretton Woods Agreement,3 7 which "did
nothing less than create the foundations of a new world economic order."3,
Since that time, the same type of legislative instrument has been used to join
NAFTA 39 and approve the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organiza-
tion. 40 And during this Administration, Congress has now approved three new
free-trade agreements-with the Republic of Korea,4 1 Colombia,42 and Panama.4 3
Because the process for domestic approval of such agreements not only elimi-
nates the need for a sixty-seven-vote supermajority, but also includes the House,
I have expressed my deep personal commitment to securing ratification of this treaty in testimony
supporting it as Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor during the
Clinton Administration, as well as in my private capacity. See Harold Hongju Koh, Why America
Should Ratify the Women's Rights Treaty (CEDAW), 34 CASE W. RES. J. Iff'L L. 263 (2002); Country
Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1999: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Operations and
Human Rights of the H. Comm. on Int'l Relations, 106th Cong. 9, 13 (2000) (testimony of Harold
Hongju Koh, Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-106hhrg65719/pdf/CHRG-106hhrg65719.pdf.
34. Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in
Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARv. L. REV. 1221 (1995).
35. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARv. L. REv. 799
(1995).
36. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
37. Bretton Woods Agreements Act, ch. 339, 59 Stat. 512 (1945) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 286
(2006)).
38. Ackerman & Golove, supra note 35, at 891.
39. North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 103-182, 107 Stat.
2057 (1993) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3473 (2006 & Supp. V 2011)).
40. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994) (codified as
amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3624 (2006)).
41. United States-Korea Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 112-41, 125 Stat.
428 (2011) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 3805 note (2006)).
42. United States-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 112-42,
125 Stat. 462 (2011) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 3805 note (2006)).
43. United States-Panama Trade Promotion Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 112-43,
125 Stat. 497 (2011) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 3805 note (2006)).
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it allows implementing legislation to become part of the international lawmak-
ing process.
What is also well settled, with Supreme Court case law to prove it, is that
there is a category of cases where the President can enter a binding international
agreement based on his own independent, Article II authorities, without action
from Congress. This was the holding of the famous Belmont" and Pink45 cases
where President Franklin Roosevelt, as part of his recognition of the Soviet
Union, agreed to settle certain interstate claims. The Court recognized not only
that the President had authority to enter into the agreement on his own authority
as President, but also found, under the Supremacy Clause, that the agreement
prevailed over any contrary state law. 46
None of this is news-you can learn it all from reading Lou Henkin's
Foreign Affairs and the Constitution4 7 or the ALI's Restatement (Third) of
Foreign Relations Law.48 But when you dig into the details, the clarity starts to
fade. Academics like to put things in boxes, and they tend to treat this area of
law as divided into three. First, you have your treaty box. Second, you have
your congressional-executive-agreement box, which is subdivided into ex ante
agreements, where Congress first authorizes the agreement by statute, and the
Executive then negotiates and concludes it; and ex post agreements, where the
Executive first negotiates an agreement and then brings it to Congress for
subsequent approval. 4 9 Third, you have your sole-executive-agreement box,
covering those areas where the President makes international law based on his
independent constitutional authority.50
But in the real world, this tidy framework grossly oversimplifies reality.
There are a wealth of international agreements that are consistent with, and can
be implemented under, existing law, but that do not fall neatly into any of these
boxes. Many of these agreements may not even be intended to affect legal
interests at the domestic level (e.g., by being judicially enforceable like in the
Pink and Belmont cases5 '). For example, recently, we in the Legal Adviser's
Office were surprised to find controversy surrounding the Executive's authority
to enter into the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), a multilateral
agreement on enforcing intellectual property rights.52 Certainly, some of that
controversy may have derived from policy disagreements with the goals of the
44. United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
45. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
46. Pink, 315 U.S. at 229-34; Belmont, 301 U.S. at 330-32.
47. HENKIN, supra note 2, at 217-29.
48. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 303, 311 (1987).
49. HENKIN, supra note 2, at 215-16.
50. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONs LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 303 (1987)
("[T]he President, on his own authority, may make an international agreement dealing with any matter
that falls within his independent powers under the Constitution."); HENKIN, supra note 2, at 219-24
(describing international agreements entered into solely by the Executive).
51. Pink, 315 U.S. 203; Belmont, 301 U.S. 324.
52. Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, Dec. 3, 2010, 50 I.L.M. 243.
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ACTA, but a surprisingly large number of law professors questioned the
Executive's legal authority even to enter the agreement. They said, in effect,
"I don't see an express ex ante congressional authorization, so it can't fit into
the congressional-executive agreement box, nor does this look like a traditional
topic for a sole executive agreement. Since it falls between the stools, that must
mean the U.S. lacks any authority to enter the agreement!"
What this misses is that legislative authority in the foreign affairs area sits not
on isolated stools, but rather runs along a spectrum of congressional approval,
as Justice Jackson suggested in his landmark concurrence in the Steel Seizure
case. 5 4 Why was entering the agreement a legally available option? First, while
Congress did not expressly pre-authorize this particular agreement, it did pass
legislation calling on the Executive to "work[] with other countries to establish
international standards and policies for the effective protection and enforcement
of intellectual property rights."55 Further, we and the United States Trade
Representative (USTR) determined that the agreement negotiated fit within the
fabric of existing law; it was fully consistent with existing law and did not
require any further legislation to implement. We also surveyed how the political
branches have dealt with similar agreements in the past and found that Con-
gress's call for executive action to protect intellectual property rights arose
against the background of a long series of agreements on the specific question
of intellectual property protection done in a similar fashion.5 6 What we saw in
practice resembles a phenomenon I called in my book The National Security
Constitution "quasi-constitutional custom," a widespread and consistent prac-
tice of Executive Branch activity that Congress, by its conduct, has essentially
accepted.57 In this respect, the ACTA resembled the Algiers Accords58 that
ended the Iranian Hostage Crisis, whose constitutionality was broadly upheld by
the Supreme Court thirty-one years ago in Dames & Moore v. Regan.5 9 There,
the Supreme Court upheld the Algiers Accords by relying not on any particular
express ex ante congressional authorization, but rather on "closely related"
53. See, e.g., Jack Goldsmith & Lawrence Lessig, Op-Ed, Anti-Counterfeiting Agreement Raises
Constitutional Concerns, WASH. POST, Mar. 26, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.conm/wp-dyn/content/
article/2010/03/25/AR2010032502403.html ("Binding the United States to international obligations of
this sort without congressional approval would raise serious constitutional questions . . . ."); Letter from
Law Professors to Barack Obama, U.S. President 2-3 (Oct. 28, 2010), http://www.wcl.american.edulpijip/
download.cfm?downloadfile= 83CE3453-EFC7-45BO-7CBA50D842A84563 ("The use of a sole execu-
tive agreement for ACTA appears unconstitutional.").
54. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-38 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
55. Prioritizing Resources and Organization for Intellectual Property Act of 2008, Pub. L. No.
110-403, § 303(a)(6), 122 Stat. 4256, 4267 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 8113(a)(6) (2006)).
56. See Letter from Ambassador Ron Kirk, U.S. Trade Representative, to Ron Wyden, U.S. Senator
(Dec. 7, 2011), in 2011 DIGEST § 4.A.2, at 109-10, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/i 94008.pdf.
57. HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-
CONTRA AFFAIR 70-71 (1990).
58. Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, Jan. 19,
1981, 20 I.L.M. 224.
59. 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
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legislation enacted in the same area and a long history of Executive Branch
practice of concluding claims-settlement agreements.6o Although the Algiers
Accords, like ACTA, did not fall neatly into any of these three "boxes," the
Supreme Court in Dames & Moore easily upheld the constitutionality of the
Algiers Accords and found a "legislative intent to accord the President broad
discretion" and, citing the Steel Seizure case, noted that such legislation "may
be considered to 'invite' 'measures on independent presidential responsibil-
ity.'",61
B. ENSURING COMPLIANCE
I've talked about a host of ways to undertake an obligation, but that's only the
beginning. You then face what international relations people call "the compli-
ance question": if the United States can lawfully enter into an international
agreement, how do you ensure that we'll comply? My office's lawmaking
practice is not limited to joining treaties and other agreements; we spend just as
much time ensuring the U.S. is in a position to comply with its international
obligations. I sometimes am asked by my European counterparts why the
United States seems slow to join international agreements, suggesting that this
shows that the United States doesn't really care about international law. In fact,
it reveals the opposite: before we undertake international commitments, we
think very carefully about what they entail, precisely because we take so
seriously those commitments we do make.
In my academic work, I have described a pervasive phenomenon in interna-
tional affairs that I call "transnational legal process": that international law is
primarily enforced not by coercion, but by a process of internalized compli-
ance.6 2 Nations tend to obey international law, because their government bureau-
cracies adopt standard operating procedures and other internal mechanisms that
foster default patterns of habitual compliance with international legal rules.63
When I became Legal Adviser, I found that this is even more true than I
thought. For example, most people are unaware of the so-called "C-175"
process, named after a 1955 State Department Circular setting out a standard-
ized procedure for concluding international agreements." The few academics
who have ever noticed that process often assume it is nothing more than a
rubber stamp. 5 But having now seen it from the inside, I can tell you that the
60. Id. at 678; id. at 680-82 (describing as "[c]rucial" to the decision "that Congress has implicitly
approved the practice of claim settlement by executive agreement" and citing examples).
61. Id. at 678 (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson,
J., concurring)).
62. See Harold Hongju Koh, Lecture, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REv. 181 (1996).
63. See id. at 199-205.
64. See Circular 175 Procedure, OFFICE OF THE LEGAL ADVISER, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, http://www.
state.gov/s/l/treaty/c 175 (last visited Oct. 31, 2012). The process has been codified at 22 C.F.R. § 181.4
(2012) and 11 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL §§ 721-27 (2006).
65. See, e.g., Oona A. Hathaway, Treaties' End: The Past, Present, and Future of International
Lawmaking in the United States, 117 YALE L.J. 1236, 1250-51 (2008) (arguing that the C-175 process
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process is exhaustive and designed to ensure that all proposed U.S. international
agreements-even if concluded by a different agency-are subject to a rigorous
legal and policy review by the State Department before being negotiated and
concluded. Through this process, the State Department plays the same kind of
clearinghouse role with respect to international agreements that the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) plays with regard to federal regulations.66 The
C-175 process ensures not only that we have the legal authority to conclude the
agreement in question, but also that every agency's lawyers fully understand the
nature of the domestic and international legal obligations we will undertake, so
that we can accurately evaluate whether the United States will be able to
comply with its new international legal obligations.
My office also steps in on the other side of the equation, in the much rarer
cases where we find ourselves falling short of compliance. One widely underap-
preciated story is our continuing effort to comply with the International Court of
Justice's (ICJ) 2004 judgment in the Avena case.6 In Avena, the ICJ famously
held that the United States had violated Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations (VCCR) 68-whereby states must inform detained foreign
nationals of their right to contact their country's consular officials to seek
assistance-with respect to fifty-one Mexican nationals on state death rows.
To remedy this violation, the court ruled that the United States had to provide
for review and reconsideration of each of the fifty-one convictions, notwithstand-
ing any procedural default rules (which in our system normally apply to
postconviction review of state convictions).o Once the ICJ gave judgment, we
had an international obligation to comply not just under the Vienna Convention
but also under Article 94 of the U.N. Charter, which requires states to comply
with ICJ judgments in cases to which they are a party.7 '
The Avena judgment inaugurated an eight-year-long effort over two Adminis-
trations to bring ourselves into compliance with the ICJ judgment. Although the
first unsuccessful phase was well publicized, our ongoing efforts at compliance
are far less well-known.
In 2005, then-President George W. Bush sought to implement the Avena
judgment by issuing a memorandum to the Attorney General directing state
courts to "give effect to the decision in accordance with general principles of
"give[s] relatively little guidance regarding the choice between a treaty and a congressionally autho-
rized executive agreement"); see id. at 1251 n.36 (collecting similar scholarly opinions).
66. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994).
67. Case Concerning Avena & Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12 (Mar. 31).
68. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, art. 36, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 100-01, 596
U.N.T.S. 261, 292-94.
69. Avena, 2004 I.C.J. I2, q[ 106.
70. Id. 152, 153(4) & 153(11).
71. U.N. Charter art. 94, para. I ("Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to comply with
the decision of the International Court of Justice in any case to which it is a party.").
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comity in cases filed by the 51 Mexican nationals addressed in that decision."72
Texas refused to comply with the memorandum and, in the 2008 Supreme Court
case of Medellin v. Texas, convinced the Court that the President acting alone
lacks the authority to enforce the Avena judgment in U.S. courts. 73 Although the
Supreme Court held that our Article 94 obligation is not self-executing or
enforceable in domestic court,74 Chief Justice Roberts expressly recognized that
the Avena judgment "constitutes an international law obligation on the part of
the United States."75 Since Medellin, we have therefore worked hard to bring
the United States into compliance with Avena (and our VCCR obligations more
generally) through three other avenues: (1) further litigation to fulfill Avena's
directive; (2) an ongoing effort to secure compliance through proposed federal
legislation, the Consular Notification Compliance Act (CNCA); and (3) continu-
ing improvements in our consular practices to ensure that no future VCCR
violations occur.
First, the United States has supported state and federal litigation to implement
our international legal obligations under Avena. In the case of Humberto Leal
Garcia, the United States supported a stay of execution for a Mexican national
subject to the Avena judgment who-in violation of our Vienna Convention
obligations-was convicted and sentenced to death following the failure of
Texas authorities to notify Mr. Garcia upon his detention of his right under the
VCCR to seek the assistance of the Mexican consulate.76 Along with Solicitor
General Don Verrilli, I signed our amicus brief in that case, making clear the
importance of the foreign policy consequences at issue,77 but a 5-4 majority of
the Court nonetheless denied the stay.78 Still, litigation in this area continues.
Just last month, the Nevada Supreme Court did remand the case of one of the
Avena defendants for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether he was
actually prejudiced by the lack of consular access. 79 Notably, the court de-
scribed the reverse hypothetical of a U.S. citizen detained in Mexico, pointing
72. Memorandum from the President for the Attorney General (Feb. 28, 2005), http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/02/20050228-18.html.
73. 552 U.S. 491 (2008).
74. Id. at 506 ("[W]e conclude that the Avena judgment is not automatically binding domestic law.").
75. Id. at 504.
76. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Applications for a Stay at *5-6,
Garcia v. Texas, 131 S. Ct. 2866 (2011) (No. 11-5001), 2011 WL 2630156.
77. Id. at *26-30.
78. Garcia, 131 S. Ct. 2866 (2011). Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and
Kagan, dissented. Id. at 2868-71.
79. Gutierrez v. State, No. 53506, 2012 WL 4355518 (Nev. Sept. 19, 2012). Even though Nevada did
not have to remand under Medellin, the Nevada court properly recognized that it could. This illustrates
the "cooperative federalism" principle that Justice Stevens discussed in his separate opinion in
Medellin-where he stated that "[olne consequence of our form of government is that sometimes States
must shoulder the primary responsibility for protecting the honor and integrity of the Nation." 552 U.S.
491, 536 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). Even if the integrity of the nation rests in a certain
circumstance in the hands of an individual state, with that power comes an independent state
responsibility to comply with international legal obligations.
736 [Vol. 101:725
TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY INTERNATIONAL LAWMAKING
out that "we would expect Mexico, on order of the ICJ, to review the reliability
of the proceedings ....
Second, this Administration has worked to develop a federal legislative
solution to implement the Avena judgment. After extensive consultations with
this Administration, in June 2011, Senator Patrick Leahy introduced the CNCA,
a bill which, if enacted, would bring the United States into compliance with our
Avena obligations by providing federal court review of the Vienna Convention
claims of foreign nationals on death row to determine whether they were
prejudiced by a consular-notification-and-access violation.s1 Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, and Attorney General Eric
Holder have all written to Senate committees expressing the Administration's
strong support for this legislation, citing its implications for the U.S. govern-
ment's ability to protect U.S. citizens overseas and to promote cross-border
law-enforcement cooperation, and legislative efforts to secure the CNCA's
passage continue even as I speak.8 2
Third, looking at our VCCR obligation more generally: we have found that
violations of consular-assistance obligations typically result not from any mal-
ice, but simply from lack of awareness of our international obligations by
street-level officials. We have therefore worked on promoting awareness among
those who are responsible for living up to our nation's obligations. Applying
transnational-legal-process techniques of norm internalization, we have sought
to achieve full compliance with the VCCR through guidance, training, and
model policies and practices to guarantee consular notification and access.
These ongoing, persistent efforts at treaty compliance are almost unknown, but
they are a critical part of abiding by our legal obligations. For nearly a decade,
the Departments of State and Justice have engaged in intensive outreach and
training efforts directed at federal, state, and local law enforcement officials, as
well as counsel and judges. Since 1997, the State Department has published and
provided free of charge a Consular Notification and Access Manual and field
trainings and briefings for federal, state, and local law enforcement, as well as
for federal and state agencies, governors' and mayors' offices, bar associations,
prison associations, and many other entities. The State Department also now
80. Gutierrez, 2012 WL 4355518, at *3.
81. Consular Notification Compliance Act of 2011, S. 1194, 112th Cong. (as introduced to Senate,
June 14, 2011). To obtain relief, such defendants face a high bar: they must establish not only a
violation of their consular-notification rights but also that the violation resulted in actual prejudice. Id.
§ 4(a)(3).
82. See Fulfilling Our Treaty Obligations and Protecting Americans Abroad: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 120 (2011) (letter from Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of
State, to Sen. Lindsey Graham (July 27, 2011)); id. at 127 (letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Att'y Gen. of
the United States & Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State, to Sen. Patrick J. Leahy (June 28,
2011)); id. at 149 (letter from Leon Panetta, Secretary of Defense, to Sen. Patrick J. Leahy (Aug. 31,
2011)).
83. See Outreach by the State Department, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, http://travel.state.gov/law/consular/
consular_2244.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2012); see also William J. Aceves, The Vienna Convention on
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disseminates information about consular notification and access requirements
on our website,8 4 as well as on such social media websites as Facebook and
Twitter. 5
C. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
Another traditional way for the Executive Branch to engage in international
lawmaking for the U.S.-even in the absence of an express agreement-is by
recognizing and helping develop certain rules as customary international law,
which result from a general and consistent practice of states followed out of a
sense of legal obligation. For example, related to what I just discussed, the State
Department takes the view that customary international law imposes on us an
obligation to provide consular notification and access upon request to nationals
even of foreign countries that are not parties to the VCCR or other applicable
bilateral treaties.
The Executive Branch has famously recognized many provisions of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties as customary international law.86
Since the late 1970s, it has done the same with respect to many aspects of the
law of the sea. In March 1983, President Reagan's Ocean Policy Statement-
noting the U.S. leadership role in developing customary law of the sea-
announced that the United States would respect the claims of other states made
in conformity with the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention and abide by the
Convention with respect to traditional uses of the ocean, such as navigation and
overflight. Provisions in the Convention were thereafter internalized across
the United States government, including in the U.S. Navy's standard operating
procedures.88 The United States has not only recognized much of the Conven-
tion as customary law, it has actively sought-through diplomacy and peaceful
Consular Relations: A Study of Rights, Wrongs, and Remedies, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 257, 323-24
(1998) ("The State Department has begun to conduct briefings on consular notification and access for
law enforcement officials throughout the country. It has developed a more comprehensive guide on
[those] issues for law enforcement agencies.").
84. The current edition of the Consular Notification and Access Manual (3d ed. 2010) is available at
http://www.travel.state.gov/pdf/cna/CNAManual_3dEdition.pdf.
85. See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of State, Consular Notification and Access, https://www.facebook.com/
ConsularNotify (last visited Oct. 31, 2012); U.S. Dep't of State, @ConsularNotify, https://twitter.com/
ConsularNotify (last visited Oct. 31, 2012).
86. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES pt. III intro (1987)
("The Department of State has on various occasions stated that it regards particular articles of the
Convention as codifying existing international law; United States courts have also treated particular
provisions of the Vienna Convention as authoritative.").
87. See Statement on United States Oceans Policy, I PuB. PAPERS 378 (Mar. 10, 1983) (stating that
the Convention contained "provisions with respect to the traditional uses of the oceans which generally
confirm existing maritime law and practice and fairly balance the interests of all states").
88. See, e.g., JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S LEGAL CENTER & SCHOOL, OPERATIONAL LAw HANDBOOK ch.
10 (2011), available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_ Law/pdfloperational-law-handbook_201 I.pdf
(relying extensively on various Convention provisions). For a fuller discussion of internalizing the
Convention and other customary international law, see Harold Hongju Koh, Address, The 1998 Frankel
Lecture: Bringing International Lw Home, 35 Hous. L. REv. 623, 639-41 (1998).
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military activities-to promote this recognition across all states. The U.S.
Freedom of Navigation program, starting in the 1970s and continuing to this
day, has implemented those procedures by opposing the maritime claims of
states that go beyond that which is permitted by the Convention."
The Executive Branch also regularly asserts customary-international-law rules
before our courts as principles to evaluate state claims of title to coastal
waters,90 to guide statutory construction, 9' and to inform federal common
lawmaking.9 2 In the area of the law of armed conflict, the U.S. government has
long recognized various rules of customary international law as binding, includ-
ing the central principles of jus in bello, such as the principles of distinction and
proportionality.93 And the U.S. government has also sought to promote the
development of customary international law. For example, in 2011, the Obama
Administration expressly declared that "[lt]he U.S. government will .. . choose out
of a sense of legal obligation to treat the [humane treatment] principles set forth
in Article 75 [of the First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions] as
applicable to any individual it detains in an international armed conflict, and
expects all other nations to adhere to these principles as well."9 4
89. See BUREAU OF OCEANS & INT'L ENvnT. & SCIENTIFIc AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STArE, LIMrrS IN THE
SEAS No. 112: UNITED STATES RESPONSES To EXCESSIVE NATIONAL MARITIME CLAIMS 6 (1992) (describing
the Freedom of Navigation program, started in 1979), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/58381.pdf; see also Koh, supra note 88, at 638-41.
90. See United States v. Louisiana (Louisiana Boundary Case), 394 U.S. 11, 22 (1969) (applying
"generally accepted principles of international law" to deny Louisiana's claim of historic title to certain
coastal waters).
91. The Executive Branch and the courts often look to customary international law as informing the
construction of statutory authorities. See United States v. Alaska, 503 U.S. 569, 588 & n.10 (1992)
(considering arguments based on the baseline provisions of the Convention on the Law of the Sea,
which the United States asserted as customary international law, to determine an executive official's
statutory authority to condition a permit); United States v. Louisiana (Alabama and Mississippi
Boundary Case), 470 U.S. 93, 106-07 (1985) (applying customary international law to define the term
"historic bay" in the 1958 Territorial Sea Convention); Finzer v. Barry, 798 F.2d 1450, 1459 (D.C. Cir.
1986) ("[W]e are asked to review a statute which both Congress and successive Presidents have
declared to be necessary to fulfill our obligations under ... customary international law. ), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part sub nom. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988).
92. In First National City Bank v. Banco Para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba (Bancec), for example,
Justice O'Connor found "the principles governing this case are common to both international law and
federal common law" and derived a federal rule regarding the piercing of the corporate veil of foreign
government entities from federal common law rules, as "necessarily informed both by international law
principles and by articulated congressional policies." 462 U.S. 611, 623 (1983).
93. See generally Michael J. Matheson, The United States Position on the Relation of Customary
International Law to the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, Remarks at the
Sixth Annual American Red Cross-Washington College of Law Conference on International Humanitar-
ian Law: A Workshop on Customary International Law and the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949
Geneva Conventions (Jan. 22, 1987), in 2 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 419 (1987).
94. Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, Fact Sheet: New Actions on Guantinamo and
Detainee Policy (Mar. 7, 2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/07/fact-
sheet-new-actions-guant-namo-and-detainee-policy.
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D. EMERGING MODES OF "NONLEGAL UNDERSTANDINGS," "LAYERED COOPERATION,"
AND "DIPLOMATIC LAW TALK"
But twenty-first-century international legal engagement is hardly limited to
these traditional tools of treaties and executive agreements and customary
international law. Much of what my office does is to help policy clients advance
their interests outside this familiar framework, oftentimes by fostering coopera-
tion with various partners in innovative ways. This can take the form of what I
call "diplomatic law talk," involving fluid conversations on legal norms. It can
also take the form of memorializing arrangements or understandings that we
have on paper without creating binding legal agreements with all the conse-
quences that entails. To take just one example, Secretary Clinton recently signed
a Memorandum of Understanding on enhancing our cooperation with the Arab
League.95 Again, its legal status is neither treaty nor agreement, but rather an
expression of mutual intent that embodies our common effort to react to the new
Middle East brought on by the "Arab Awakening."
Or take the Obama Administration's efforts to renew the United States'
engagement in international diplomacy to address the threat of global climate
change. In 2009, many hoped that the climate-change conference in Copenha-
gen would yield a new climate-change treaty. When it became clear that would
not be achievable, the international community, led by President Obama and
Secretary Clinton, was able to agree on the Copenhagen Accord: a political,
non-legally-binding document, that moved away from the Kyoto Protocol para-
digm by securing commitments to address climate change from developed and
developing countries alike.9 6 At a crucial moment in climate diplomacy, the
Copenhagen countries for the first time agreed on a global aspirational tempera-
ture goal; all key countries listed the emissions actions that they would imple-
ment;97 everyone agreed to transparency procedures; and a new global climate
fund was spawned. While not legally binding, the Copenhagen outcome paved
the way for last year's Durban Conference, where the world again decided to
pursue a climate agreement of a more legal character-a protocol, legal instru-
ment, or agreed outcome with legal force.99
95. See Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State, Remarks at the United Nations Security Council
Session on Peace and Security in the Middle East (Sept. 26, 2012), available at http://www.state.gov/
secretary/rm/2012/09/198276.htm.
96. Copenhagen Accord, Dec. 18, 2009, in United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, Report of Conference of the Parties on Its 15th Sess., Dec. 7-19, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2009/l1/
Add.l at 4 (Mar. 30, 2010).
97. See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Copenhagen Accord Appendix
I-Quantified Economy-Wide Emissions Targets for 2020, http://unfccc.int/meetings/copenhagen-
dec_2009/items/5264.php (last visited Nov. 1, 2012).
98. See Copenhagen Accord, supra note 96, at 7.
99. For an account of the role the Legal Adviser's Office played in Durban, see John M. Broder, U.S.




Another recent example is the 2010 Washington Communiqu6 of the Washing-
ton Nuclear Security Summit, hosted here by President Obama.'" Again, the
text is not legally binding, but it includes significant undertakings, and states
have already made significant progress in fulfilling their pledges and improving
nuclear security.' 01
These nontraditional efforts at legal diplomacy also include what I call
"layered cooperation." In any given area of international cooperation, the choice
between international agreements and nonlegal alternatives is not binary. In-
stead, the legal and the nonlegal understandings are layered and operate on
different levels. Take for example the Arctic Council, a group of eight Arctic
States-Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the
United States-which has emerged as an impressive example of a nonlegal
mechanism to facilitate sustainable development and international cooperation
in the Arctic.i0 2 The cooperation that takes place within the Arctic Council-
generally through nonbinding means-is layered on top of a legal backdrop of
the Law of the Sea Convention, and the customary international law it reflects,
which answer important questions about sovereign rights and jurisdiction in the
Arctic. Now notice that the Council is not a formal international organization; it
was not set up by an international agreement, and the majority of its work is not
legally binding. But this has not detracted from-and has probably even en-
hanced-its success in facilitating robust international cooperation among the
Arctic States at all levels, ranging from foreign ministers to bench scientists.
Yet another example of this kind of layered cooperation can be found in outer
space. The exploration and use of outer space is conducted pursuant to impor-
tant multilateral treaties as old as space exploration itself. But to address
contemporary problems presented by new capabilities and new actors, instead
of new international agreements, space-faring states have favored legally nonbind-
ing principles and technical guidelines that are layered on top of those preexist-
ing treaties. 03
We have also engaged in an innovative kind of "diplomatic law talk" on the
ultimate twenty-first-century legal issue: the law that applies to cyberspace. In
this area, a few countries have sought to promote entirely new treaties and
100. Communiqud of the Washington Nuclear Security Summit (Apr. 13, 2010), available at
http://photos.state.gov/libraries/libya/19452/public/NSS%20-%20Communique%2OWith%2OLogo%20
0407 10.pdf.
101. See Laura Holgate, Senior Director, Nat'l Security Staff, Exec. Office of the President,
Remarks: The Outcomes of the 2010 Washington Summit (Oct. 7, 2011), available at http://www.state.
gov/t/isn/rls/rm/I 84951 .htm.
102. See About the Arctic Council, ARcnc COUNCIL, http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/
about (last visited Nov. 7, 2012).
103. See, e.g., G6rardine Meishan Goh, Softly, Softly Catchee Monkey: Informalism and the Quiet
Development of International Space Law, 87 NEB. L. REv. 725, 736 (2009) ("Practically speaking,
informalism is well and thriving in various aspects of the development of international space law. From
the overarching framework proposed for space traffic management and situational awareness, to the
charter developed for disaster management and emergency response, the movement to informalism is
gaining ground.").
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codes to regulate the Internet.'0 The U.S. government has opposed these
law-creation efforts-not because we don't think there should be any rules
governing cyberspace, but to the contrary, because we believe there is already
established law that applies. At the same time, we acknowledge that when it
comes to new technologies, it will not always be clear exactly how existing law
applies. 0 5 So rather than start writing entirely new rules from scratch, we've
taken the approach of engaging in a series of legal conversations-diplomatic
law talk-with our international partners to promote consensus around interna-
tional norms in various areas of cyber law.
For example, I recently gave a speech at U.S. Cyber Command presenting the
U.S. views on ten questions regarding international law and cyberspace, focus-
ing on the context of use of force and armed conflict. The answers to these
questions state important principles, including the recognition that a cyber
attack can, under certain circumstances, constitute an illegal use of force; that
under certain conditions, such an attack can give rise to a right of self-defense
(jus ad bellum); and that in the context of hostilities, cyber operations must
abide by the law of armed conflict, including the jus in bello principles of
"distinction" and "proportionality."1 0 6 Beyond cyber conflict, Secretary Clinton
has been vocal in supporting cyber freedom: the proposition that the human
right of freedom of expression, enshrined in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights' 0 7 and codified in the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, 08 applies online, just as it does offline.' 09
In political science terms, what we are doing is not "lawmaking" per se, so
much as it is what international-relations theorists call "regime-building"-in
the sense of fostering discussion and building consensus about a set of norms,
rules, principles, and decision-making procedures that converge and apply in a
particular issue area."o Some of the documents that emerge from these diplo-
matic discussions might be described as "soft law," inasmuch as they seek to
define new norms, or speak to how established norms should apply to new
104. See, e.g., Letter Dated 12 September 2011 from the Permanent Representatives of China, the
Russian Federation, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-
General, U.N. Doc. A/66/359 (Sept. 14, 2011).
105. Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State, Remarks at USCYBERCOM Inter-
Agency Legal Conference: International Law in Cyberspace (Sept. 18, 2012), available at http://www.
state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/197924.htm (explaining that "the difficulty of reaching a definitive legal
conclusion or consensus among States on when and under what circumstances a hostile cyber action
would constitute an armed attack does not automatically suggest that we need an entirely new legal
framework specific to cyberspace").
106. Id.
107. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (IH) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III)
(Dec. 10, 1948).
108. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171, S. EXEC. Doc. E, 95-2.
109. See, e.g., Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State, Remarks on Internet Freedom (Jan. 21,
2010), available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/01/135519.htm.
110. See Robert O. Keohane, The Demand for International Regimes, 36 IW'L ORG. 325 (1982).
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circumstances. This kind of law talk always precedes and sometimes takes the
place of formal lawmaking, in the cyber area, for example, in meetings with
counterparts from other countries at the U.N. Group of Government Experts on
information technology issues. In fact, a large part of my job as Legal Adviser
has been to hold regular meetings with groups of Legal Adviser counterparts for
the express purpose of discussing emerging areas of consensus in these areas of
law. Through this iterative process, where international lawyers from many
countries talk about these issues bilaterally, plurilaterally, and multilaterally, we
are building what international-relations theorists call an "epistemic commu-
nity"' or what my late Yale colleague Bob Cover called a "community of
interpretation"-international lawyers speaking the same language to describe
the same transnational phenomenon as it plays out in their country and in their
foreign relations." 12
E. HYBRID PRIVATE-PUBLIC ARRANGEMENTS
Finally, the new twenty-first-century international lawyering process recog-
nizes that states are not the only actors. Of course, neither international law nor
foreign policy have ever been completely restricted to states, but the prolifera-
tion and influence of nonstate actors has "gone viral" in recent years." 3 And so
it is inevitable that the United States government now finds itself developing
relationships not just with states, but with civil-society and industry groups too,
among others. With this trend has come an explosion in so-called "public-
private partnerships," or "hybrid arrangements."1 14
One early and important landmark was the Voluntary Principles on Security
and Human Rights, an initiative I helped launch in 2000 during my last days as
Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor in the
Clinton Administration. 1 5 The Voluntary Principles bring together govern-
ments, companies, and NGOs to promote guiding principles for oil, gas, and
mining companies on providing security for their operations in a manner that
respects human rights.' 6 Because this initiative is explicitly "voluntary" in
name, it hardly constitutes "international lawmaking" in a traditional sense. At
111. See Peter M. Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordina-
tion, 46 INT'L ORG. I (1992).
112. See Robert M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARv. L. REv. 4,42 (1983).
113. See, e.g., Anthea Roberts & Sandesh Sivakumaran, Lwmaking by Nonstate Actors: Engaging
Armed Groups in the Creation of International Humanitarian Law, 37 YALE J. INT'L L. 107, 113 (2012)
(noting that "various nonstate actors, including nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), global eco-
nomic players, and the global media, play an increasingly important role in the international commu-
nity").
114. See, e.g., Davinia Aziz, Global Public-Private Partnerships in International Law, 2 ASIAN
J. INT'L L. 339, 339 (2012) ("[Plublic-private partnerships between states and a variety of non-state
actors have proliferated as vehicles for functional co-operation at the global level.").
115. See Timeline of Events, VOLUNTARY PRINCIPLES ON SECURITY & HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www.
voluntaryprinciples.org/timeline/index.php (last visited Nov. 2, 2012).
116. See Participants, VOLUNTARY PRINCIPLES ON SECURITY & HUMAN RIGHTs, http://www.voluntary
principles.org/participants/ (last visited Nov. 2, 2012)
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the same time, it represents a way of setting standards and pursuing the ends of
human-rights lawmaking-fostering a culture of respect for certain rights-but
using the novel means of a public-private forum to advance that project. The
Voluntary Principles help companies identify human-rights risks and take mean-
ingful steps to address those risks in a manner that helps ensure respect for
human rights in their operations. 17
One thing we've done to advance this project during the Obama Administra-
tion is to advocate the creation of an entity to provide administrative and
financial support to the Voluntary Principles Initiative. Rather than sign an
international agreement or create a new international institution, the participants
have now done something novel: set up a corporate-type "association" under
Dutch law, with a U.S. government official serving on the board of directors on
a rotating basis."' So the current framework of cooperation exemplifies the
modern "hybrid arrangement": to promote international norms and respect for
human rights in the extractive industries, participants have set up a public-
private partnership through which best practices can be shared and norms
internalized. And we've helped set up an entity to provide the initiative neces-
sary support-organizing that entity under the law of the Netherlands!
Another, more recent, example is the set of hybrid arrangements we have
developed to create the International Code of Conduct for Private Security
Service Providers." 9 Over the last decade or so, we have seen an increased need
both to utilize private contractors in high-risk environments and to hold those
contractors accountable1 20-highlighted most tragically by the killings in Nisoor
Square in Iraq, a case that the Justice Department is currently prosecuting.12 ' In
response to these killings, the Bush Administration engaged in the development
of the Montreux Document,12 2 a "nonlegally binding" but politically consequen-
tial international instrument that laid out important principles for the regulation
of private contractors in a military environment. In addition to compiling a set
of good practices, the document set out the established law applicable to this
117. See Timeline of Events, VOLUNTARY PRINCIPLES ON SECURITY & HUMAN RIGHrs, http://www.
voluntaryprinciples.org/timeline/index.php (last visited Nov. 2, 2012).
118. See The Voluntary Principles on Security & Human Rights, Request for Proposal for Hosting
the Secretariat of the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, at app. B (Oct. 22, 2012),
http://voluntaryprinciples.org/files/VoluntaryPrinciples-Request-fOrproposals VPsSecretariat
October_2012.pdf (describing the new entity).
119. INTERNATIONAL CODE OF CONDUCT FOR SECURITY SERVICE PROVIDERS (2010), http://www.icoc-psp.org/
uploads/INTERNATIONALCODEOFCONDUCTFinalwithoutCompany-Names.pdf.
120. See Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State, Remarks at Signing Ceremony for
International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers 2 (Nov. 9, 2010), available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/179307.pdf.
121. See Frederic J. Frommer, DOJ To Seek New Indictment in Blackwater Shooting, AssocIrED
PRESs, July 25, 2012, http://www.federalnewsradio.com/489/2960619/DOJ-to-seek-new-indictment-in-
Blackwater-shooting.
122. THE MONTREUx DOCUMENT. ON PERTINENT INTERNATIONAL LEGAL OBLIGATIONS AND GOOD PRAC-
TiCES FOR STATES RELATED To OPERATIONS OF PRIVATE MILITARY AND SECURITY COMPANIES DuuNo ARMED
CONFucr (2008), available at http://www.icrc.orglenglassets/files/other/icrc_002_0996.pdf; see id. at 41
(describing the creation of the document).
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new phenomenon-an effort not unlike the cyber work I've just described.
Since Montreux, we've added another layer by helping to create the Interna-
tional Code of Conduct.123 Instead of negotiating a traditional state-to-state
agreement, we have helped develop an innovative public-private partnership,
striving to bring government, industry, and civil society together to promote
higher standards for private security companies. You can think of it as shifting
from an approach that focuses largely .on static contracts to one that also
emphasizes evolving and deepening public-private relationships.
As of today, in a remarkably short period of time, the Code has been signed
by over five hundred private security companies (PSCs), including many that
contract with the U.S. government in places like Iraq and Afghanistan. 12 4
Companies that sign the Code commit to principles regarding the conduct of
personnel and security-management practices. Just as important, they commit to
work with other stakeholders toward the establishment of governance and
oversight mechanisms to ensure implementation of the principles laid out in the
Code through effective certification, auditing, monitoring, and reporting, as well
as through the development of third-party-complaint mechanisms. Stakeholders
are making progress in moving this initiative forward, evidenced in part by the
finalization earlier this year of an American National Standards Institute stan-
dard on PSC operations that may be utilized by the certification process.' 25 The
nature of the PSC industry creates significant practical challenges for traditional
legal regimes, but innovative initiatives such as the Code offer a chance to make
real progress in changing security-contracting practices and improving compli-
ance with recognized principles and norms.12 6
CONCLUSION
In closing, professors and students taking classes in international law still like
to focus on concrete treaty language and judicial decisions. These remain
important and are still the leading texts of international law. But the world has
become far more fluid and messy. International legal instruments do not come
neatly packaged into tripartite constitutional boxes. The process of ensuring
national compliance with international obligations-both before and after ratifi-
cation of a treaty-now often takes us out of courtrooms and into the halls of
123. INTERNATIONAL CODE OF CONDUCT FOR PRIVATE SECURITY SERVICE PROVIDERS (2010), available at
http://www.icoc-psp.org/uploads/INTERNATIONALCODEOFCONDUCTFinalwithout-Company-
Names.pdf.
124. See THE INTERNATIONAL CODE OF CONDUCT FOR PRIVATE SECURITY SERVICE PROVIDERS SIGNATORY
COMPANIES, http://www.icoc-psp.org/uploads/SignatoryCompanies - October_2012_-_CompositeList
SHORT _VERSION.pdf (updated Oct. 1, 2012).
125. See Press Release, Am. Nat'1 Standards Inst., ASIS International Releases American National
Standard on Management of Private Security Providers (May 3, 2012), http://web.ansi.org/news-
publications/news-story.aspx?menuid=7&articleid= 3235.
126. The Code focuses directly on the conduct of the companies that agree to undertake these
commitments, and while states do not undertake any binding obligations as a result of this process, our
engagement has helped facilitate the development of this process.
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Congress, or onto blogs and Twitter, or into the offices of foreign policy
bureaucrats or even local sheriffs.
Increasingly, traditional forms of international legal engagement do not con-
vey the entire picture of our legal diplomacy. We help our clients advance
foreign policy objectives through an innovative array of binding and nonbinding
arrangements, layered cooperation, normative dialogues, and hybrid public-
private partnerships. We have broadened our focus beyond a narrow view of
international lawmaking that focuses only on the wording of particular treaties,
to include innovative techniques of norm enunciation and forum creation that
promotes adherence to important shared principles.
Twenty-first-century lawmaking is not limited to traditional "lawmaking" in
the sense of drafting codes and static texts, so much as it is a process of building
relationships to foster normative principles in new issue areas, leading to "soft
law," "regime-building," and sometimes eventually crystallizing into legal norms.
Now this is not new. In their classic 1988 political science book Hanging
Together, Harvard's Robert Putnam and Nicholas Bayne described how the G-8
summit evolved from an informal meeting into a quasi-international institution,
without ever crossing the line into formal lawmaking.12 7 But increasingly, we
now develop international law more and more through diplomatic law talk-
dialogue within epistemic communities of international lawyers working for
diverse governments and nongovernmental institutions. On a regular basis, I
find myself holding meetings with groups of Legal Adviser counterparts to
discuss emerging legal norms in an array of areas.
Perhaps someday these norms will crystallize and, if necessary and advisable,
become a basis for a multilateral treaty negotiation. But even if they don't, some
of what we do creates a record of state practice and builds a process of
generating opinio juris, the notion that states engage in those practices out of a
sense of legal obligation. So even when their meetings don't involve drafting
and concluding agreement language, government lawyers find themselves con-
tributing to the development and application of international law.
What I hope this Lecture has conveyed is that twenty-first-century interna-
tional lawmaking is not a rote checklist of traditional hornbook tools, such as
treaties and executive agreements. Instead, it includes a living, breathing human
tapestry of meetings, relationships, and other communications-personal and
virtual-all focused on the broader tasks of promoting cooperation, engage-
ment, and norm promotion.
Make no mistake: this is not your grandfather's international law. This is not
a Westphalian top-down process of treaty making where international legal rules
are negotiated at formal treaty conferences, to be handed down for domestic
implementation in a top-down way. Instead, it is a classic tale of what I have
long called "transnational legal process," the dynamic interaction of private and




public actors in a variety of national and international fora to generate norms
and construct national and global interests. 128 The story is neither simple nor
static. Twenty-first-century international lawmaking has become a swirling
interactive process whereby norms get "uploaded" from one country into the
international system and then "downloaded" elsewhere into another country's
laws or even a private actor's internal rules.
Now I am sure that Hugo Grotius had it good in his time. But believe me:
there has never been a more challenging and exciting time to be an international
lawyer or an international lawmaker. I have been lucky to spend my whole
career steeped in this heady environment as a lawyer, scholar, advocate, and
public official. To be sure, there will always be challenges. But still, I find no
belief more contagious than this simple, idealistic conviction, shared by so
many: that even in a new millennium, it is still possible to aspire to help build a
vibrant world order based on law.
128. See generally Koh, supra note 62.
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